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Abstract:  
Medicaid reimburses healthcare providers for services at a lower rate 
than any other type of insurance coverage. To account for the burden of 
treating Medicaid patients, providers claim that they must cost-shift by raising 
the rates of individuals covered by private insurance. Previous investigations 
of cost-shifting has produced mixed results. In this paper, I exploit a disabled 
Medicaid expansion where crowd-out was complete to investigate cost-
shifting. I find that hospitals reduce the charge rates of the privately insured. 
Given that Medicaid is expanding in several states under the Affordable Care 
Act, these results may alleviate cost-shifting concerns of the reform. 
Keywords: Medicaid, Health Insurance, Hospitals, Cost Shifting 
JEL: I11, I13 
I. Introduction 
Health care providers receive lower reimbursements from 
Medicaid than any other type of health insurance.  In 2012, the 
average Medicaid reimbursement rate was only 66 percent of the 
Medicare rate which is typically lower than the rate from commercial 
insurance plans (Zuckerman and Goin 2012).  The Medicaid rate must 
                                                          
*  I am grateful to William Evans, Daniel Hungerman, Ethan Lieber, and numerous seminar 
participants at the University of Notre Dame. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 49 (September 2016): pg. 46-58. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
2 
 
be accepted as payment-in-full which means that providers receive no 
additional coinsurance payments nor can they extract any additional 
fees from a Medicaid patient even if the reimbursement rate is less 
than the total cost of care.  As a result, health services providers 
receive less compensation from a Medicaid patient relative to a patient 
with any other form of health coverage and often argue that rates are 
not even enough to cover costs.  In order to subsidize the low rates 
from Medicaid patients, some suggest that hospitals raise prices for 
privately insured patients to subsidize Medicaid patients.  Don George, 
the President and CEO of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Vermont wrote that  
“When government reimbursements are insufficient to cover the 
cost of the services a facility provides to Medicare or Medicaid 
beneficiaries, hospitals charge patients with private insurance 
enough to cover not only the cost of their services, but the 
shortfall created by government reimbursements as well” 
(George 2014).  
Charging higher private rates to make-up for public shortfalls is 
referred to as cost shifting and has been believed by health care 
administrators to be a key strategy for managing low public 
reimbursement rates.1 A study by the Milliman Institute estimated that 
the cost-shift from public to private patients was a total of $88.8 billion 
or 15 percent of all medical costs in 2006/2007 (Fox and Pickering 
2008). In this article I focus on dynamic cost-shifting – a phenomenon 
in which a negative exogenous shock to revenue causes an increase in 
prices for privately insured patients.   
Economists have proposed several theoretical models of hospital 
pricing behavior, but they produce conflicting predictions regarding the 
practice of dynamic cost shifting.  A key takeaway from these models 
is that cost shifting depends on whether a hospital acts as a profit 
maximizer or as a utility maximizer and there is no consensus on  
                                                          
1 Dennis Vonderfecht, CEO of Mountain States Health Alliance stated that “Existing government 
health care programs such as Medicaid fall short of covering actual health care costs -- meaning 
the company depends on ‘cost-shifting’ to private insurance patients, who pick up more than the 
cost of treatment.” (McCown 2009).  
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which behavior is most common to the hospital.2 Given the 
inconclusive nature of the theoretical predictions, it is not surprising 
that the large empirical literature that has sought to estimate the 
existence and extent of cost shifting has produced a broad range of 
estimates.3   
The goal of this paper is to test the cost-shifting hypothesis by 
exploiting recent Medicaid expansions for individuals with disabilities 
that reduced the average revenue per patient received by hospitals.  
Wagner (2015) demonstrated that these Medicaid expansions led to 
100 percent crowd-out of private health coverage among the disabled 
population.  Crowd-out occurs when newly eligible individuals with 
private health insurance drop their current health plans in favor of 
public coverage through Medicaid.  Since crowd-out in the disabled 
Medicaid expansions was complete, the take-up of Medicaid by newly 
eligible individuals was offset by an equal reduction in private 
insurance coverage.  This movement of patients from private 
(generous reimbursement) to Medicaid (less generous reimbursement) 
insurance generates lower revenues per admission and is simply a 
drop in revenue for health care providers.  Using this change in 
revenue, this paper tests for the presence of cost-shifting among a 
population of disabled patients.   
 This paper is unique along a number of dimensions.  First, the 
majority of work on hospital cost shifting has used changes to the 
Medicare program as a source of a shock to provider revenues.  
Medicaid, however, is a state run program and is inherently different 
from the federally run Medicare program.  There are often additional 
expenses associated with Medicaid (lower reimbursement rates for 
certain procedures, difficult administrative practices, and different 
beneficiaries) that lead to Medicaid patients being less profitable to 
physicians than Medicare.  Due to this difference in profitability, health 
care providers may have greater incentive to cost-shift in response to 
                                                          
2 For example, see Sloan et al. (1973), Dranove (1988), Morrisey (1996), Showalter (1997), 
Clement (1997), Zwanziger et al. (2000), Rosenman et al. (2000), and Friesner and Rosenman 
(2002). 
 
3 See Clement (1997), Gowrisankaran and Town (1997), Cutler (1998), Dranove and White (1998), 
Zwanziger et al. (2000), Friesner and Rosenman (2002), Dobson et al. (2006), Zwanziger and 
Bamezai (2006), Wu (2010), Stensland et al. (2010), and Frakt (2011) for empirical estimates of 
cost-shifting. 
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changes in the Medicaid program.  Additionally, the cost-shifting 
discussion has gained steam throughout the implementation of the 
policies stipulated under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA).  Given that one of the largest pieces of the PPACA is the 
expansion of the Medicaid programs in several states, examining 
hospital responses to an increase in Medicaid beneficiaries is especially 
relevant.     
Second, most empirical approaches to identify cost shifting 
behavior have relied on changes in the actual public reimbursement 
rate as the source of shock to provider revenue but there are concerns 
that public reimbursement rates may be strategically chosen by the 
government in response to private prices (Glazer and McGuire 2002).  
Public and private patients share, to a certain degree, the privileges 
and procedures offered by the hospital even though private patients 
pay more for these services.  If government payers are aware that 
hospitals will offer these shared services so long as private patients 
will pay for them, they may adjust their rates to optimize the benefit 
from the “commonality” of care public patients have with private 
patients.  Thus, empirical cost shifting estimates using changes in 
public reimbursement rates for identification may be biased by reverse 
causality.  The shock to revenues used in this project more closely 
resembles the thought experiment considered in theoretical work than 
previous empirical tests of the cost-shifting hypothesis since 
identification is from an average change in revenue per patient 
resulting from crowd-out in disabled Medicaid expansions.  This 
exogenous event likely bypasses concerns of reverse causality that are 
present when using changes in Medicare list charges as I discuss 
further below.   
The first step in this project is to verify the existence of the one-
for-one shift in insurance types within the dataset.  Wagner (2015) 
used data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
and the March Current Population Survey (CPS) to demonstrate that 
Medicaid expansions for the disabled generate 100 percent crowd-out.  
In this paper, I use data from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) 
of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) from the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality and replicate the basic results of 
Wagner (2015) with hospitalizations.  Using Currie and Gruber’s 
(1996a and 1996b) measure for simulated eligibility, I find that 
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Medicaid coverage for inpatient stays increased by roughly the same 
amount in magnitude as private coverage decreased.  Taken together, 
these results imply that crowd-out within the inpatient setting is 
complete and there is a one-for-one relationship between Medicaid 
take-up and private coverage reduction for the disabled population.  
I find that in response to the shift in insurance types, hospitals 
reduced the average charge rate for disabled patients with private 
insurance, while charge rates for disabled patients with other payer 
types are not statistically significantly different as a result of the 
insurance shift from the Medicaid expansion.  This behavior is 
consistent with a Mixed Economy Model where the hospital acts as a 
profit maximizer (Sloan et al. 1978).  These results are important 
given that cost-shifting has been a major concern of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  There has been much 
speculation that the PPACA Medicaid expansions ongoing in several 
states will result in increases of private out-of-pocket medical 
expenses and insurance premiums due to cost-shifting.  The results of 
this paper suggest otherwise for the disabled population and that 
instead hospitals actually reduced charges for privately insured 
disabled patients.  Though the PPACA Medicaid expansions affect a 
general population of working age adults, the results for the disabled 
population in this paper suggest that cost-shifting may not be the only 
response of a hospital when faced with a revenue reduction.   
The rest of paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes our 
current state of knowledge of cost-shifting.  Section III outlines the 
research strategy.  Section IV details the data and estimating 
equations used for the study.  Section V presents the results of the 
paper.  Section VI concludes. 
II. Conflicting Models and Inconclusiveness: The 
Ongoing Cost-Shifting Debate 
Cost-shifting occurs when one consumer type is charged a 
higher price so that another type can pay a lesser price relative to 
costs.  Though this sounds very similar to price discrimination, the 
presence of price discrimination does not automatically imply the 
presence of cost-shifting.  Both price discriminators and cost shifters 
require that the supplying firm has some market power, but under 
price discrimination, there does not need to be a direct connection 
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between the different prices the discriminator charges the different 
groups.  In contrast, with cost-shifting there is a causal and dynamic 
connection between the different prices charged by cost shifters.  
Thus, while cost shifting always involves some degree of price 
discrimination, it is not always the case that price discrimination 
means cost shifting. 
Figure I plots the times series trends of the aggregate hospital 
payment-to-cost ratios for private, Medicare, and Medicaid insurance 
in the United States from 1992 to 2012.4  The trends documented in  
Figure I demonstrate a negative correlation between private 
and public hospital payments. This negative correlation is consistent 
with what cost-shifting behavior would suggest but is by no means 
conclusive proof of cost-shifting. Cost-shifting relies on there being a 
causal relationship between public and private prices and the trends in 
Figure I can only demonstrate a correlation.  There are numerous 
reasons beyond cost-shifting that could potentially explain the trends 
in Figure I. 
Previous work investigating cost-shifting has produced 
conflicting theoretical and empirical results.  Theoretical models follow 
the mixed economy approach originally discussed in Sloan et al. 
(1978).  In the mixed economy model, hospitals offer services in both 
a private market, where they have market power and face downward 
sloping demand, and a public market, where a third party (the 
government) sets the price.  Theoretical cost-shifting models differ on 
one key assumption: are hospitals profit maximizers or utility 
maximizers?  This assumption leads to different outcomes regarding 
the ability of firms to cost shift.   
In standard market models, profit maximizing firms should have 
already exhausted their market power and chosen profit maximizing 
prices. This eliminates the possibility to further price discriminate and 
subsequently the ability to cost shift onto private payers (Morrisey 
1996).  Given that only 18 percent of US hospitals in 2011 were 
investor-owned (for-profit), many theorists assume hospitals to 
behave as utility maximizers and maximize utility from total volume of 
medical services in addition to profits generated (American Hospital 
                                                          
4 The hospital payment-to-cost ratios are from the American Hospital Association’s Trendwatch 
Chartbook. 
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Association 2013).  While utility maximizing behavior does not 
guarantee the use of cost-shifting, it does allow for the possibility 
unlike profit maximization.   
Given the conflicting predictions of profit and utility maximizing 
approaches, several studies have attempted to empirically test for the 
presence of cost-shifting behavior.  These studies focus not only on 
whether hospitals cost shift, but also to what extent cost shifting 
occurs.  Empirical estimates of cost-shifting are widely mixed though 
most find small extents of cost-shifting if they find that it does occur.5  
The goal of this paper is to add to the empirical literature on cost 
shifting by using a new approach in which I test for the presence of 
cost-shifting as a response to a shift in patient insurance mix from a 
Medicaid expansion. 
One concern with current cost shifting estimates is that it is 
measured in terms of direct changes to the actual public 
reimbursement rate (usually Medicare) and it is possible that these 
rates are not chosen exogenously.  Once admitted to a hospital, 
patients share to a certain degree in services and amenities the 
hospital offers no matter their insurance type. For example, most 
hospitals will not have two separate MRI machines, one a top-of-the-
line model for higher paying private patients and the other an old out-
of-date model for the government reimbursed public patients.  The 
hospital cafeteria will also not have two separate menus where private 
patients are offered steak and lobster and the public patients are 
offered bologna sandwiches. Thus, when a hospital makes an 
investment into new equipment or amenities, it is likely that both 
types of patients will benefit to some degree and we refer to this 
phenomenon as the “commonality” of care amongst patients.   
If the degree of commonality is substantial between the two 
types, then public patients benefit from the level of care for which 
private patients pay higher prices.  Payment rates set by hospitals for 
the private market reflect not only the cost of the actual treatment for 
a patient, but also investments into new equipment or training, 
                                                          
5 Several empirical studies attempt to measure the extent of hospital cost shifting empirically.  
Studies include Clement (1997), Gowrisankaran and Town (1997), Cutler (1998), Dranove and 
White (1998), Zwanziger et al. (2000), Friesner and Rosenman (2002), Dobson et al. (2006),  
Zwanziger and Bamezai (2006), Wu (2010), and Stensland et al. (2010). These are effectively 
summarized in Frakt (2011), Table 2. 
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maintenance and upkeep of facilities, and general amenities the 
hospital chooses to offer.  The government is aware of the fact that 
public patients benefit from these investments even though the 
hospital is not reimbursed at the same rate for providing them 
treatment.  It is possible that the government can strategically set the 
public reimbursement rate (with knowledge of the private rate) with 
the intent of optimizing the degree of commonality between public and 
private patients (Glazer and McGuire 2002).  Thus, the private rates 
could actually influence the government rate setting process which 
would result in reverse causality in the empirical equation.  It is 
therefore a concern that empirical estimates may be biased when a 
direct change in public reimbursement rates is used for identification.  
In this paper, my research strategy will not use a change in the 
reimbursement rate for identification and the empirical estimates will 
avoid any reverse causality concerns originating from strategic public 
price setting.     
Another limitation of current cost shifting estimates is that most 
of them are estimated relative to changes in the Medicare program.  
The Medicaid program, even though it is slightly smaller than the 
Medicare program, is another important public health insurance 
program in the United States.  In 2012, Medicaid expenditures were 
$421.2 billion which is 25 percent less than total Medicare spending 
($572.5 billion) (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014).  
Though both programs provide health insurance to their recipients 
using government funds, Medicaid and Medicare are incredibly 
different programs.   
First, the two programs have different funding and 
administrative practices.  Medicare is entirely federally funded with all 
of its eligibility requirements, reimbursement rates, and operating 
procedures completely determined by the federal government.  
Medicaid, on the other hand is a state-run program that is dually-
funded by both the state and federal governments.  States are allowed 
to choose their own eligibility requirements, reimbursement 
rates/policies, and coverage options and as long as these selections 
meet federal minimums, the federal government will reimburse at 
least 50 percent of all Medicaid expenditures.6  Given that states are 
                                                          
6 The federal reimbursement rate of Medicaid expenses in each state is called the Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP).  States receive an FMAP of at least 50 percent but no 
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the administrators of their own programs, Medicaid program 
characteristics can vary quite a bit across states whereas Medicare is 
virtually the same throughout the entire country.  These differences in 
administration could result in longer reimbursement periods and 
increased processing time for patients leading to additional costs for 
the provider (both in time and money).  Additionally, Medicaid 
reimbursement rates are not the same as Medicare’s and can be 
considerably lower for certain procedures.  These added costs in 
conjunction with the potential for lower payments could lead to 
providers having an increased incentive to cost shift for Medicaid 
patients. 
Second, the beneficiaries covered by Medicare and Medicaid are 
not the same.  Medicare covers mostly elderly individuals (65 or older) 
and those who are receiving Social Security Disability Insurance.  
Medicaid covers a wide variety of populations (women, children, 
elderly, and disabled) with the foremost eligibility requirement being 
that a recipient must have low income and limited financial resources.  
The Medicare program has no income restriction to qualify and most of 
its beneficiaries are actually required to pay some type of coinsurance 
fees.7  The bulk of Medicaid policies require no type of copayment for 
treatment.  Given the diversity in their beneficiaries, it is possible that 
hospitals and health care providers may respond differently to changes 
in the two programs and so it is important to investigate cost shifting 
from a Medicaid perspective which is what is pursued in this paper.  
See Appendix A.2 for a more detailed description of previous cost-
shifting literature. 
III. Research Strategy 
To improve upon earlier work, I employ an alternative method 
of identifying cost shifting that avoids using a change in the 
reimbursement rate and also measures cost-shifting from a Medicaid 
perspective.  I take advantage of a unique Medicaid expansion 
described in Wagner (2015).  The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 
(OBRA86) gave states the authority to increase Medicaid income 
                                                          
more than 74.73 percent. States with lower incomes per capita relative to the US income per 
capita receive higher reimbursement rates from the federal government (Baumrucker 2010). 
 
7 Coinsurance fees for individuals who are dually eligible for both the Medicaid and Medicare 
programs are paid for by their Medicaid program. 
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eligibility for disabled individuals up to 100 percent of the Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL).  Prior to this authorization, the majority of 
disabled individuals had to qualify for Medicaid through the 
Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) which had an eligibility 
cutoff of approximately 74 percent of the FPL.  By 2003, 21 states and 
the District of Columbia had enacted the OBRA86 expansion (Herz et 
al. 2006).   
A major concern with any public health insurance program 
expansion is the potential for crowd-out – when individuals with 
private insurance gain Medicaid eligibility and drop their private 
coverage in favor of public benefits.  The rate of crowd-out has been a 
key focus of the public health insurance expansion literature and 
crowd-out for children and families has been estimated to be as high 
as 50 percent though results have been mixed across studies and 
methodologies.8  Wagner (2015) investigated the degree of crowd-out 
in the disabled Medicaid expansions authorized under the OBRA86.  
Using both the March Current Population Survey and the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation, the study finds that crowd-out for 
the disabled population was large.  The 2SLS estimates imply that for 
every individual who took up Medicaid through the eligibility 
expansions someone lost their private insurance.9   
Since crowd-out in these expansions was complete, disabled 
individuals shifted from private health insurance (generous 
reimbursement) to Medicaid coverage (less generous reimbursement) 
with little change to the overall insurance rate.  Given this shift, the 
overall patient pool had less revenue generating capability after the 
expansions, reducing revenue to hospitals without any direct change to 
                                                          
8 See Aizer and Grogger (2003), Blumberg et al. (2000), Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004), Cutler 
and Gruber (1996), Dubay and Kenney (1996) and (1997), Gruber and Simon (2008), Ham and 
Shore-Sheppard (2005), Hamersma and Kim (2013), Hudson et al. (2005), LoSasso and 
Buchmueller (2004), Shore-Sheppard (2008), Thorpe and Florence (1998), and Yazici and 
Kaestner (2000).  See Hamersma and Kim (2013) and Gruber and Simon (2008) for a review of 
this literature. 
 
9 These results are thought to indicate a switch from private to public coverage by the individuals 
who take-up Medicaid coverage.  Since the analysis uses cross sectional data from the March CPS 
and the SIPP (even though the SIPP is a panel data set it is treated as cross sectional for the 
analysis) this cannot be stated conclusively given that the cross sectional data surveys different 
individuals over time.  The results do indicate a compositional change of insurance coverage type 
for individuals who become eligible for Medicaid coverage through the expansion. 
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the Medicaid reimbursement rate itself.  Thus, the degree of crowd-out 
resulting from changes to Medicaid eligibility can be used to identify 
any changes in hospital pricing behavior resulting from the reduction 
to revenue.  A benefit to this strategy is that we avoid the potential for 
reverse causality that originates from strategic pricing to optimize 
patient commonality of care. 
Figure II presents a graphical representation of predictions of 
the effect of crowd-out on medical prices from the mixed economy 
model.  In the price setting market (private health insurance), health 
care providers face a downward sloping demand curve Demand 1 that 
corresponds to marginal revenue curve MRP1 and have a marginal cost 
curve MC.  Since the government has complete control over the prices 
paid to providers for treating public patients, the government 
reimbursed market is represented by the horizontal line at a fixed 
reimbursement rate, Pm.  Prior to the public insurance expansion, 
health care providers face the marginal revenue curve ACD and will 
offer Q amount of medical services at a price of P1 if they have a 
marginal cost curve given by MC.  
When Medicaid eligibility is expanded and crowd-out occurs, 
patients will shift from insurance carriers in the private market to 
Medicaid coverage in the government reimbursed market.  Since the 
expansions only affect the eligibility standards, the public 
reimbursement rate, Pm, is not altered and the government market 
demand curve is unaffected by the legislation.  In the private market, 
the shift in insurance type means that MRP1 will rotate to MRP2 
(Demand 1 rotates to Demand 2) since the number of privately 
covered patients is reduced (Garthwaite 2012).  A key advantage of 
the Medicaid expansions for individuals with disabilities is that crowd-
out was essentially complete.  This means that there will be no 
countervailing effects on hospital revenue resulting from the uninsured 
gaining access to health coverage through Medicaid. 10 After the 
expansion, the hospital now faces a marginal revenue curve ABCD and 
the price for the provider with supply curve MC will decrease from P1 to 
                                                          
10 If the uninsurance rate were to decrease, then this would suggest that some previously 
uninsured individuals gained insurance coverage.  This could result in a positive shock to provider 
revenue, since prior to the expansion hospitals received zero reimbursement from these patients 
and are now receiving at least the Medicaid level of reimbursement. Since the uninsurance rate 
remains unchanged, there is no counterveiling effect on provider revenue and only a revenue 
reduction. 
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P2.  The new level of medical services provided decreases from the 
original Q, but will be higher than if the price had remained at P1 
accounting for the new Demand.  Note also, that according to the 
model, only providers who treat at least some patients in the private 
market will be impacted.  Those who are operating solely in the 
Medicaid market will not experience a shift in the demand curve.  
Thus, the model predicts that the opposite of cost shifting will occur.  
That is, hospitals will actually lower their prices for privately covered 
patients. 
There may be a concern that state governments can control the 
level of crowd-out in a public insurance expansion in such a way as to 
optimize the commonality of care between public and private patients.  
If governments have this ability, then cost-shifting estimates using my 
research strategy are potentially subject to the same biases as those 
that are measured relative to the public reimbursement rate as was 
the case in earlier literature.  There are several reasons why this is not 
an issue.  Unlike the Medicaid reimbursement rate, states cannot 
directly set the level of crowd-out in a public insurance expansion.  
They can only control the eligibility levels which indirectly influence the 
degree of crowd-out.  It is hard to imagine that states have great 
control over the degree of crowd-out purely through eligibility levels.  
Even further, the OBRA86 expansions only allowed states to select 
eligibility levels below 100 percent of the FPL so they did not have free 
reign over their eligibility standards.   
Another reason I suspect that the strategic selection of crowd-
out is not an issue in this case is the large magnitude of the crowd-out 
rate.  Crowd-out is a contentious issue in public health insurance 
expansions drawing much debate and criticism. As a result, 
governments would ideally desire for the level of crowd-out to be as 
close to zero as possible and we would expect any type of state 
selection to bias the rate of crowd-out down. Given that the rate of 
crowd-out for the Medicaid disability expansion was 100 percent 
(essentially the highest possible level), this suggests that states were 
not strategically capable of selecting the degree of crowd-out within 
these expansions. 
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IV. Data and Estimating Equations 
A. Data 
 The main data source for this project is the Nationwide 
Inpatient Sample (NIS) which is part of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project (HCUP) produced by the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality.  The HCUP NIS contains information on 
discharges from nearly 8 million hospital stays each year in the United 
States that includes patient demographics, hospital identifiers, 
duration of hospital stay, diagnosis codes, total charges, and expected 
payment source (i.e. insurance type).  Weighted, the HCUP NIS 
represents nearly 35 million hospital stays each year (HCUP databases 
2009).  Though the HCUP NIS contains a varying number of 
participating states over time, with proper weighting the sample of 
discharges in the dataset should be stratified in such a way to be a 
national representation of all inpatient discharges in the United States.  
My analysis will use data from the 1995-2007 HCUP NIS.11 
I impose a number of restrictions to construct my study sample.  
The Medicaid expansions being examined in this paper only apply to 
individuals with disabilities.  Thus, the main sample only considers 
discharges where the patient had a disability.  For the purposes of this 
paper, I define disability to be the presence of a chronic condition on a 
patient’s discharge record since chronic disease is the leading cause of 
disability.  I describe in a later section how I determine within the NIS 
if a patient has a chronic condition.  Given that most individuals 65 
years and over are automatically covered by Medicare, I restrict the 
sample to individuals under 65 years old. Children (individuals under 
the age of 20) are eliminated from the sample since Medicaid has 
higher eligibility levels for them. Women are excluded due to their 
potential to qualify for Medicaid coverage if they are pregnant.  Many 
Medicaid programs also provide coverage to women who are 
diagnosed with breast or cervical cancer.  Given these other 
prospective coverage pathways for women, the study sample only 
includes men. 
A person’s race is strongly related to their participation in the 
Medicaid program and I exclude 10 states not reporting this 
                                                          
11 The 100% NIS sample is used for the analysis though smaller subsets of the data are available. 
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information.  One additional state (Wisconsin) was also excluded due 
to inconsistent charge reporting noted by HCUP in their data 
documentation.  The final sample contains 30 of 41 possible states.  To 
reduce the computational dimension of the problem some, only the top 
100 primary diagnosis codes are used in the main analysis.  These 
diagnosis codes account for 57 percent of all disabled male discharges 
and 52 percent of all disabled male medical charges in the HCUP NIS.   
A limitation to the HCUP NIS is that it only contains information 
regarding total charges rather than total payments for each discharge.  
Though the terms payments and charges are often used 
interchangeably, they do not often refer to the same measurements.  
Given that these measurements are often not the same, we may be 
concerned about what results on charges in the HCUP NIS may imply 
about potential impacts on actual payments.  I address this concern in 
Appendix A.3, by making a comparison between the charges for 
private insured patients from the HCUP NIS and the payments 
contained in the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters 
database.  The analysis suggests that charges and payments are 
related, but the measurement between the two is noisy (see Appendix 
A.3 for further detail). 
A unique quality of the HCUP NIS is that it contains data for 
multiple insurance types: Private, Medicaid, Medicare, Self-pay, 
Charity-care, and Other. The insurance type of “other” contains a wide 
variety of insurance policies including military/veteran’s insurance, 
workman’s compensation, and state-specific insurance pools.  Since 
the insurance policies contained in this group are so broad, I exclude 
individuals with “other” insurance type from the main sample.12   
Summary statistics for the final sample are presented in Table I.  
The final sample contains almost 4.9 million male discharges.  Males 
with private insurance account for 49 percent of the sample while 
Medicaid and Medicare each account for 19 and 21 percent, 
respectively.  The remaining discharges are either covered by self-pay 
(uninsured) or charity-care from the hospital.  The average charges 
per discharge were $26,279 in real 2007 dollars with an average 
duration of hospital stay equal to 5.2 days.  The sample was 
                                                          
12 Only 6% of disabled working age male discharges in the HCUP NIS were reported as having 
“other” type of health insurance.  
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approximately 70 percent white, 19 percent black, and 9 percent 
Hispanic. 
B. Identifying Disability 
 The HCUP NIS does not directly report whether a patient 
has a disability and since the Medicaid expansions being used for 
identification are only for those with disabilities, it is important to 
utilize an appropriate method of identifying disabled individuals within 
the HCUP NIS.  The definition of disability used for Medicaid eligibility 
determination is the same as the definition used by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) for SSI qualification.  SSA guidelines dictate that 
an adult is considered disabled if she has a “medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment” that prevents “substantial gainful 
activity” and is expected to “result in death” or has “lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months” 
(Social Security Administration 2012).  This definition is very broad 
and relies heavily on a physician’s judgment.   
In this paper, I will use the presence of a chronic condition as a 
proxy for disability.  Though they are not perfectly correlated with the 
SSA’s disability definition, chronic conditions are the leading cause of 
disability in the United States and are likely strongly related (CDC, 
2014).  The most common causes of disability over the study period 
were all prominent chronic conditions (Hootman et al. 2005).  Using 
the diagnosis code information from each discharge contained within 
the NIS, I can identify whether an individual has some form of chronic 
disease.  To do this I use the Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups 
(ACG) System which will take the diagnosis codes from the discharge 
record, determine which of these codes are considered to be chronic 
conditions, and then form a count of total chronic conditions on a 
patient’s record.  I then consider a patient to be disabled if they have 
one or more chronic conditions reported on their diagnosis record.  The 
top five primary diagnosis codes for men with at least one chronic 
condition on their record are reported in Table II. Most of these 
conditions are related to heart or lung problems which were the most 
commonly reported forms of disability in the 2005 Survey of Income 
and Program Participation.  
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C. Measuring Crowd-out 
In order to evaluate the expansion’s effect on the cost shifting 
behavior of hospitals, we need to construct a measure of the shift in 
insurance type that results from crowd-out.  In the public insurance 
expansion literature that attempts to measure crowd-out, authors use 
data at the individual level to construct dependent variables that are 
dummy variables measuring insurance status such as having Medicaid 
or private insurance.  These insurance status variables are then 
regressed on a dummy variable that measures whether the respondent 
is eligible for the Medicaid program.  Eligibility status in these studies 
is imputed using reported financial and family information and as such 
likely contains measurement error.  The regression is also subject to 
an omitted variables bias in that there is a mechanical reverse 
correlation between dependent and independent variables since 
disabilities reduce earnings and lower earnings people are more likely 
to qualify for Medicaid.  To correct for both of these issues, the model 
is estimated with 2SLS using a suitable instrument for Medicaid 
eligibility. 
Wagner (2015) uses the simulated eligibility instrument 
originally outlined in Currie and Gruber (1996a and 1996b) to 
investigate the crowd-out rate in the Medicaid expansions for 
individuals with disabilities.  Simulated eligibility uses a fixed national 
population and compares that population to a state’s annual Medicaid 
eligibility rules.  The share of the fixed sample that qualifies for 
Medicaid under a state’s rules represents the simulated instrument.  
Thus states with more generous Medicaid programs will have higher 
simulated eligibility.  Wagner (2015) uses this simulated measure to 
instrument for imputed eligibility and finds that for every 100 people 
made eligible through the expansion, nearly 41 took up Medicaid 
coverage while 44 lost private coverage.  Taken together, these results 
suggest that individuals shifted onto public coverage from private 
coverage at an approximately one-for-one rate. 
The data necessary to construct simulated eligibility is the 
Medicaid qualification rules for the disabled from 1995 to 2007 by 
state.  Disabled individuals have multiple routes they can pursue in 
order to gain Medicaid coverage such as poverty related coverage 
through the OBRA86, the Supplemental Security Income Program, or 
the State Supplemental Payment Program.  During the study period, 
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poverty related coverage is experiencing the most changes and most 
of the variation is derived from this pathway.  Taking into account the 
eligibility rules of all these different avenues, I construct an upper 
income limit – the maximum amount of income an individual with a 
disability is allowed to possess and still qualify for Medicaid coverage 
under one of the programs.13  Table III contains the upper income 
limits for states in the sample in their first year of reporting to the 
HCUP NIS and the last year of the sample period (2007).  These upper 
income limits demonstrate that there is quite a bit of variation in 
Medicaid eligibility rules across states and time.    
Following the strategy employed in Wagner (2015), I use the 
March Current Population Surveys from 1996 to 2008 and restrict the 
sample to men between the ages of 20 and 64 who report having a 
work limiting disability.14 Using this sample, the simulated eligibility 
measure is constructed as the percentage of disabled men that would 
be eligible for Medicaid coverage under each state’s eligibility rules by 
year.  These percentages are then matched by state and year to the 
HCUP NIS.  The simulated instrument is a measure of Medicaid 
generosity by state and year that reflects variation in the legislative 
changes in eligibility rules and not changes in the characteristics of a 
state’s population.  Simulated eligibility acts as a measure of how 
likely crowd-out is to occur and we can use simulated eligibility as a 
measurement of a shock to provider revenue.  The simulated eligibility 
levels for a state in their first and last year of the sample are displayed 
in Table III along with the corresponding upper income limits that 
generated them.   
The variation in the instrument is generated by changes in state 
legislation concerning Medicaid eligibility rather than individual 
                                                          
13 These rules were compiled from published sources following strategies described in Brown et 
al. (2007) and Coe (2005). The specific sources used to construct the upper income threshold of 
Medicaid eligibility rules for the aged and disabled were Brown et al. (2007) , Bruen, Wiener, and 
Thomas (2003), Bruen, Wiener, Kim, and Miazad (1999), Coe (2005) , Congressional Research 
Service (1993), De Nardi et al. (2011), Horvath (1997), Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured (2010), Kassner (2000), Mississippi Division of Medicaid (1991-2008), Social Security 
Administration (1991-2008), Stone (2002, 2011), and state Medicaid websites.  
 
14 Wagner (2015)’s primary analysis relied on data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) which is a monthly level household survey, but found similar results using the 
March CPS.  Given that the NIS is an annual survey, this paper uses the March CPS to construct 
simulated eligibility in order to better align with the timeline of the NIS. 
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characteristics of a state and its residents.  For this measure to 
provide consistent estimates it must be the case that the changes in 
the legislation are exogenous.  This observation is consistent with the 
assumption that states experiencing increased eligibility in their 
Medicaid rules did not have different trends in coverage rates 
compared to states with static eligibility rules over the same period.  
Using disabled working age individuals from the March CPS 1992 to 
2008, I test whether there is a difference in pre-treatment trends in 
insurance coverage between reform and non-reform states.15  The 
results indicate no significant difference between trends pre and post 
expansion.  See the Appendix A.1 for the results of this analysis. 
D. Estimating Equations 
Given that the HCUP NIS contains millions of discharges, my 
analysis will collapse the HCUP NIS into cells based on hospital, time, 
insurance type, and various discharge characteristics.  Collapsing the 
data in this way will help to reduce the computational strain of the 
regression when I control for various fixed effects and calculate 
clustered standard errors.  In order for the identification strategy I am 
proposing to be valid, it must be the case that a shift in insurance 
types occurred in the HCUP NIS data as a result of the Medicaid 
expansions for the disabled.  To verify that such a shift did occur, I use 
the collapsed data to estimate the following equation:  
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑 = 𝜎 + 𝜃𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝜕ℎ + 𝐾𝑡 + 𝜌𝑑 +
𝜀ℎ𝑡𝑑                                                                     (1) 
 
where h, t, and d represent the hospital, time, and discharge 
characteristics, respectively.  The dependent variable in this equation, 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
insurance type of the cell is of a certain type and 0 otherwise.  Using 
the constructed sample of discharges from the HCUP NIS, Equation (1) 
                                                          
15 The sample contains observations from all states and not just HCUP participating states to fully 
document no difference in the pre-trends for all reforming and non-reforming states. 
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is estimated for four types of insurance coverage: Private, Medicaid, 
Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity.   
Hospital, time, and discharge characteristic fixed effects are 
given by𝜕ℎ, 𝜅𝑡, and 𝜌𝑑 , respectively.  Hospitals are identified using the 
hospital identification variable provided within the HCUP NIS.  Time 
fixed effects account for both the year and the quarter of the 
discharge.  Discharge characteristic fixed effects control for the 
primary diagnosis, race, age, and duration of stay of the patient. The 
primary diagnosis codes follow the International Classification of 
Diseases version 9 Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM). Race includes 
indicators for whether a patient is white, black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific 
Islander, Native American, or other.  Age is broken down into five 
categories: 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-64 years old.  
Duration of hospital stay is divided into 7 groups: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-
19, 20-24, 25-29, and 30+ days.  The key variable of interest in 
Equation (1), 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, is simulated disabled Medicaid eligibility for 
hospital, h, in time, t,.  The coefficient on this variable, 𝜃, measures 
the impact of the Medicaid expansions on insurance type and 
demonstrates the mechanism behind the change in provider revenue.  
Since Medicaid expansions are determined by the state, I cluster the 
standard errors at the state level to allow for any arbitrary 
correlation.16,17 Regressions are weighted by the NIS discharge weight 
that have been aggregated to the hospital-time-discharge 
characteristic-insurance cell level. 
 Once the insurance shift is verified within the HCUP NIS, 
we can then proceed to investigate the direct effect of Medicaid crowd-
out on the charge rates by insurance type. To do this I estimate 
Equation 2:   
                                                          
16 I have also run specifications where I cluster at the hospital level and the results are similar.  
The structure of HCUP NIS is such that some hospitals are sampled for more than one year, but 
this is not the case for all years and all hospitals.  Since Medicaid eligibility is set at the state level, 
it is likely that the appropriate correlation we need to account for is within the state. 
 
17 I bootstrapped a few of my standard errors since I had only 30 clusters.  Given that the 
computational demand of the bootstrapping procedure is large, I only did this for a few 
regressions.  The statistical significance of the results did not change greatly. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 49 (September 2016): pg. 46-58. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
20 
 
ln(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝛿ℎ + 𝜏𝑡 +
𝛾𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑡𝑑                                                      (2) 
 
The indices and 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 are defined the same as they were for 
Equation 1. Hospital, time, and diagnosis fixed effects are defined 
similarly and are given by 𝛿ℎ, 𝜏𝑡, and 𝛾𝑑, respectively.  The dependent 
variable, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑
 , is constructed by dividing the sum of the 
total charges by the total number of patients in each hospital-time-
discharge characteristic-insurance cell.  Equation 2 is then estimated 
separately for each of the four types of insurance.  The key variable of 
interest is again, 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, with 𝛽 as the estimate of the impact of the 
insurance shift on the log charge rate for hospital h, at time t, with 
discharge characteristics d. 
V. Results 
A. Shifts in Patient Insurance Mix in the HCUP NIS 
A crucial step in this study is to verify the results from Wagner 
(2015) by showing that estimates from Equation (1) imply complete 
crowd-out of private health coverage by the Medicaid expansions for 
the disabled.  Estimates of Equation (1) are presented in Table IV.  
The estimate of the coefficient on simulated eligibility in column 1 of 
Table IV suggests that for a ten percentage point increase in simulated 
eligibility, there was a 3.48 percentage point decrease in the number 
of private discharges.  This estimate is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.  The effect of simulated eligibility on Medicaid coverage 
(column 2 of Table IV) is an increase of 2.98 percentage points for a 
ten percentage point increase in simulated eligibility and is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. These estimates suggest a crowd-out 
rate equal to 117 percent and are consistent with the results found in 
Wagner (2015) which estimated the rate of crowd-out to be around 
110 percent using data from the SIPP.18  The shifting from private 
                                                          
18 The rate of crowd-out is constructed as the share of Medicaid take-up that is accounted for by 
private coverage reduction. 
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insurance to Medicaid coverage results in an estimated $24 million in 
lost charges from the study sample of working aged disabled men.19 
The estimated effects on Medicare and Uninsured/Charity 
coverage are considerably smaller in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant implying that there was little change to the overall rate of 
insurance.  The estimates in Table IV confirm the existence of a shift 
from private to Medicaid coverage that generates a revenue loss to 
hospitals holding patient mix constant. 
B. Effects on the Average Charge Rate 
Given the verification of the insurance shift, we can now use 
simulated eligibility as a proxy to estimate an effect of the revenue 
reduction resulting from the private to Medicaid coverage shift on the 
average charge rate for patients in the HCUP NIS.  Estimates of 
Equation 2 are presented in Table V for each type of insurance 
coverage.  For privately covered patients, a 1 percentage point 
increase in simulated Medicaid eligibility resulted in a reduction of the 
average charge rate by 1.2 percent (column 1 of Table V) which is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Using the average 
charges for private patients and the average change in simulated 
eligibility, this estimate suggests an average decrease of $1,100 or 4 
percent per private discharge. 
The effect on the average charge rate for Medicaid patients 
(column 2 of Table V) was virtually zero, suggesting a statistically 
insignificant 0.08 percent reduction in the charge rate for a 1 
percentage point increase in simulated eligibility.  No change in the 
average Medicaid charge rate is expected since hospitals have no price 
setting power in the Medicaid market where reimbursement is 
determined by the state government.  The estimated effects on the 
charge rates for the two remaining insurance types are statistically 
insignificant though the estimates of their coefficients are not as close 
to zero as the coefficient for Medicaid.  These results are consistent 
with the predictions of the mixed economy model from Figure II and at 
                                                          
19 On average simulated eligibility increases by 3.3 percentage points, suggesting a 1 percentage 
point (9,233 individuals in the study sample) increase in Medicaid patients in the inpatient 
setting.  The average difference in charges between private patients and Medicaid patients is 
equal to $2,622 resulting in lost charges from crowd-out in the sample equal to 
9,233*$2,622=24,208,926. 
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the very least imply that hospitals do not employ cost-shifting 
strategies among disabled patients in response to the disabled 
Medicaid expansions.  Instead, hospitals reduce charges for private 
patients while average charges for all other insurance types do not 
significantly change within the disabled population.   
C. Results for Men with No Chronic Conditions 
 The Medicaid expansions only increased eligibility for individuals 
who had a disability.  Since the HCUP NIS did not contain any direct 
data on whether a patient was disabled or not, I defined disability to 
be represented by the presence of a chronic condition on a patient’s 
diagnosis record.  We may be concerned, however, that this may not 
be an appropriate proxy for disability.  One way to examine the 
validity of this definition is by looking at individuals who have no 
chronic conditions on their record.  These individuals, by my definition, 
are not disabled and should therefore not experience a change in 
insurance coverage. Table VI presents patient insurance mix results for 
a sample of working age men who had no chronic diseases on their 
discharge record.  As expected, there is no statistically significant 
change in any type of insurance coverage for this particular group and 
importantly the coefficient for Medicaid coverage is near zero.  Though 
not explored in this paper, it is possible that there is a spillover effect 
on the average charge rate for non-chronic men.  As a response to the 
decline in payments from the disabled group, hospitals may have tried 
to alter pricing strategies for the non-disabled group as well.  This will 
be explored in future work. 
Admittedly, the coefficient on private insurance coverage for 
non-chronic condition men is almost statistically significant at the 10% 
level and this raises some concerns regarding the identification 
strategy.  Given that more individuals in the non-chronic market are 
privately insured (mean is 0.63 vs. 0.49) the effect is considerably 
smaller percentage wise for non-chronic individuals compared to the 
effect for chronic individuals (38 to 71 percent, respectively).  The 
results in Table VI imply that men without chronic conditions were less 
likely to be covered by private insurance and essentially become 
uninsured or covered by charity care according to the estimates.  This 
could lead to two possible outcomes.   
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First, the movement of the nonchronic from private to 
uninsured/charity care status could result in hospitals desiring to 
further intensify cost-shifting onto private patients by increasing their 
prices.  If this be the case, then my cost-shifting estimates would be 
understated as this behavior would work against my current estimate, 
biasing them towards zero.  Second, if hospitals instead decided to 
lower private rates in response to non-chronic private movement, then 
my results would be overstated as the reduction in price would work 
with my cost-shifting estimates. 
Both of these possibilities rely on the hospital actually losing 
revenue from the shift of non-chronic patients from private to 
uninsured/charity status.  Despite not having insurance, uninsured 
patients often end up paying at least a portion of their costs out-of-
pocket allowing hospitals to at least recoup some of their losses even if 
the patient isn’t able to pay in full.  Additionally, non-chronic patients 
also tend to have smaller average total charges than chronic patients.  
Thus, it is likely that the average revenue loss from a non-chronic 
patient will be smaller than a chronic patient.  Provided they lose 
revenue in the non-chronic market, it must also be the case that 
hospitals seek to recover it from the chronic market.   
The key takeaway from the estimates in Table VI is that despite 
the expansions in eligibility for disabled Medicaid beneficiaries, men 
with no chronic conditions were unable to obtain Medicaid coverage.  
This suggests that the presence of a chronic condition was an 
appropriate method of identifying individuals who had the potential to 
gain public coverage through Medicaid.  There is a potential, however, 
that my estimates may be biased by the unusual trends in private 
insurance in the nonchronic market.  Given the reasoning above, 
however, I anticipate this bias to be small.    
D. Average Charges Per Day Results 
The charge rate for the analysis in Table V is constructed as the 
average total charges per discharge by insurance type.  Though the 
results in Table V control for duration of stay fixed effects, we may 
also be interested in the effect on average total charges per day spent 
in the hospital. Table VII presents estimates of Equation 2 where the 
dependent variable is the log of average charges per day spent in the 
hospital.  Regressions in Table VII do not control for duration of stay 
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fixed effects since this is accounted for in the denominator of the 
dependent variable.  The effect on the charge rate per day for private 
patients in Table VII, column 1 indicates a reduction of about 1 
percent for a 1 percentage point increase in simulated eligibility.  This 
represents a decrease of about 79 dollars per day and is statistically 
significant at the ten percent level.  Given that the average hospital 
stay was 5.2 days long, this translates into about $1,373 per privately 
insured patient which is consistent with the estimated effect from 
Table V.  The estimated effects on the charge rates per day for the 
three remaining insurance types were all statistically insignificant. 
E. Varying the Number of Diagnoses in the Study 
Sample 
The main analysis restricts the sample to the top 100 primary 
diagnoses among working age men with at least one chronic condition.  
We may be concerned, however, that this restriction is too selective 
and that the results presented in Table IV and Table V will vary with 
the number of diagnoses included in the sample.  Table VIII addresses 
these concerns.  Panel A of Table VIII presents estimates of Equation 1 
and Equation 2 where the sample is restricted to the top 50 primary 
diagnoses among men with at least one chronic condition.  Panel B of 
Table VIII repeats the same analysis with the top 500 primary 
diagnoses.   
The results in Panels A and B are virtually the same as in the 
main analysis with the top 100 diagnoses.  The rate of crowd-out is 
112 percent for the top 50 diagnoses and 105 percent for the top 500 
diagnoses.  The reduction in the average private charge rate is 1.3 
percent and 1.1 percent per 1 percentage point increase in simulated 
eligibility for the 50 and 500 diagnoses samples respectively.  Using 
the average change in simulated eligibility, this translates into 
reductions of $1,201 and $1,033 for private insured patients from the 
top 50 and 500 diagnoses, respectively.  These results are consistent 
with estimates from the top 100 diagnoses sample and alleviates the 
concern that reduction in the private charge rate is limited to a specific 
subsample of diagnoses among disabled men. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Cost-shifting has been a major topic of discussion within the 
United States healthcare market ever since cost containment through 
reduced public reimbursements was first proposed several years ago.  
Previous results (both theoretical and empirical) on cost-shifting have 
been mixed, but hospital and healthcare executives continue to claim 
that it is their main method of coping with low reimbursement rates 
from Medicaid or Medicare.  A report by Milliman in 2006 estimated 
that the aggregate amount of cost-shifting (the gap between total 
Medicaid payments and private insurance payments) from Medicaid to 
Commercial patients was $16.2 billion for hospital care alone (Fox and 
Pickering 2008).20   
The development and implementation of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act has reawakened the cost-shifting debate.  
Given the large Medicaid expansions that are already underway in 
some states, many private consumers and insurance companies are 
speculating that increases in private out-of-pocket medical expenses 
and insurance premiums from cost-shifting are inevitable.  The Galen 
Institute argued that the expansion of Medicaid through the PPACA 
would result in a “hidden tax” on millions of privately insured patients 
and lead to a vicious cycle in which more and more patients would 
drop private coverage because of its growing premiums (Turner and 
Roy 2013). 
The results of this paper would suggest the opposite, however.  
Hospitals do not employ cost-shifting strategies to the privately 
insured disabled in response to the Medicaid expansions for the 
disabled.  Instead, they actually reduce charges for privately insured 
patients suggesting that the privately insured disabled actually 
benefitted from the expansions in terms of charges.  Admittedly, the 
Medicaid expansions for the disabled were unique and the results may 
not generalize to the broader populations affected by the PPACA 
Medicaid expansions.  At the very least, however, these results 
suggest that cost-shifting is not the hospital’s only method of dealing 
with lower revenues as healthcare executives often claim. 
                                                          
20 Milliman is an independent consulting specializing in actuarial products, but the cost-shifting 
study cited here was requested by America’s Health Insurance Plans, the American Hospital 
Association, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, and Premera Blue Cross. 
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An important aspect not explored in this paper are the 
mechanisms by which the cost reduction occurs.  Do hospitals simply 
absorb these charge reductions and accept lower profit margins or do 
they cut costs in other ways?  One concern might be that the overall 
quality of care is reduced.  Preliminary results (not reported) suggest 
that mortality rates for the privately insured and uninsured/charity-
care patients may be worsening, but further analysis is required.  
There are several other quality measures of interest such as the 
likelihood of relapse/hospital re-admittance, length of recovery time, 
level of investment in new technology/equipment, or presence of post 
discharge complications (i.e. infections).  Unfortunately, the HCUP NIS 
does not have information on these quality measures so I leave this 
analysis for future work. 
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Table I: Summary Statistics for Working Age Men with At Least One 
Chronic Condition in HCUP NIS Sample Top 100 Primary Diagnosis Codes 
 
Notes: Summary statistics are weighted using the discharge weight 
constructed by the HCUP NIS. Charges are in 2007 real dollars 
 
Table II: Top 5 Primary Diagnoses Working Age Men with one Chronic 
Condition in the HCUP NIS 1995-2007 
 
Notes: Diagnosis codes follow the ICD-9-CM strategy. 
 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 49 (September 2016): pg. 46-58. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
33 
 
Table III: Medicaid Upper Income Threshold (UIT) and Simulated Eligibility  
for States in HCUP NIS First and Last Years in Sample 
 
Notes: The Upper Income Threshold (UIT) is the maximum amount of income 
as a percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) that an individual is allowed to 
have and still qualify for Medicaid coverage.  Simulated Eligibility is 
constructed as the share of a national sample that would be eligible for 
Medicaid if a state’s eligibility standards were imposed on the entire country.  
UIT and Simulated Eligibility are reported for the first year a state enters the 
constructed sample and in 2007 (the last year of the study period). 
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Table IV: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Insurance Type for Hospitals 
from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for Working Age Men 
with At Least One Chronic Condition 
 
Notes: Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis codes for working age 
men with at least one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS.  The dependent 
variables are indicator variables for four insurance types: Private Insurance, 
Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care.  All regressions control for 
Hospital, Year, Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age Category, and Duration of Stay 
Category Fixed Effects. Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight 
constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent 
significance level, and *** represents a 1 percent significance level.   
Table V: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Log Charge Rate by Insurance 
Type for Hospitals from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for 
Working Age Men with At Least One Chronic Condition 
 
Notes: Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis codes for working age 
men with at least one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS.  Regressions are for 
four insurance types: Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and 
Uninsured/Charity Care.  The payment rate is constructed as the average 
charges per patient by insurance type.  All regressions control for Hospital, 
Year, Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age Category, and Duration of Stay Category 
Fixed Effects. Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight 
constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent 
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significance level, and *** represents a 1 percent significance level.  The 
charge rate is constructed by dividing total aggregate charges by total 
discharges in a cell. 
Table VI: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Insurance Type for Hospitals 
from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Working Age Men with No Chronic Diagnoses 
 
Notes: Results are for working age men with no chronic condition in the HCUP 
NIS.  The dependent variables are indicator variables for four insurance 
types: Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care.  
All regressions control for Hospital, Year, Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age 
Category, and Duration of Stay Category Fixed Effects. Regressions are 
weighted using the discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and 
standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents a 10 percent 
significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** 
represents a 1 percent significance level.   
Table VII: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Log Charges per Day by 
Insurance Type for Hospitals from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary 
Diagnoses for Working Age Men with At Least One Chronic Condition 
 
Notes: Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis codes for working age 
men with at least one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS.  Regressions are for 
four insurance types: Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and 
Uninsured/Charity Care.  The payment rate is constructed as the average 
charges per patient by insurance type.  All regressions control for Hospital, 
Year, Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, and Age Category Fixed Effects.  Regressions 
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are weighted using the discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and 
standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents a 10 percent 
significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** 
represents a 1 percent significance level.  The charge rate is constructed by 
dividing total aggregate charges by total days spent in the hospital in a cell. 
Table VIII: Effects on Insurance Type and Log(Charge Rate) for 
Hospitals from  HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 50 and 500 Primary 
Diagnoses for Working Age Men with At Least One Chronic Condition 
 
Notes: Results are for the top 50 (Panel A) and top 500 (Panel B) primary 
diagnosis codes for working age men with at least one chronic condition in 
the HCUP NIS.  The dependent variables in the Insurance Type Analyses (I) 
are indicator variables for four insurance types: Private, Medicaid, Medicare, 
and Self-pay/Charity.  The dependent variable for Log(Charge Rate) (II) is 
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constructed as the log of the total aggregate charges divided by total 
discharges in a cell for a given insurance type. All regressions control for 
Hospital, Year, Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age Category, and Duration of 
Stay Category Fixed Effects. Regressions are weighted using the discharge 
weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at 
the state level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 
5 percent significance level, and *** represents a 1 percent significance 
level.   
 
Figure I: Aggregate Hospital Payment-to-Cost Ratio, by Insurance Type, 
1992-2012 
 
 
Notes: Data sourced from the American Hospital Association’s Trendwatch 
Chartbook 2014, Table 4.  The figure includes a time series from 1992 to 
2012 of aggregate total payments relative to the total costs required to treat 
private, Medicaid, and Medicare patients for US hospitals. Payments include 
Medicare and Medicaid Disproportionate Share payments. 
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Figure II: Graphical Representation of the Mixed Economy Model 
 
Notes: In a mixed economy model, hospitals face two markets: a price setting 
market represented by downward sloping demands corresponding to marginal 
revenue curves MRP1 and later MRP2 and a government reimbursed market 
represented by a horizontal line at the public reimbursement rate Pm.  When 
crowd-out occurs in a Medicaid expansion, MRP1 rotates to MRP2 and the price 
for a hospital with marginal cost curve MC decreases from P1 to P2. 
Appendix 
A.1: Pre and Post Expansion Trends 
The key outcomes are a set of measures of coverage rates at the 
state-year level of the four forms of insurance listed in Table A.1.  I then 
regress these coverage rates on state and year effects plus two variables that 
measure the pre- and post-adoption trends for the states.  The pre-adoption 
trend is constructed as a negative integer that indicates the number of years 
until an expanding state’s adoption and zero for non-adopting states or for 
years after a state adopted. The post-adoption trend variable is constructed 
as a positive integer that indicates the number of years after an expanding 
state’s adoption and zero for non-adopting states or for years prior to a 
state’s adoption.21   
The regression results for the pre-treatment analysis are presented in 
Table A.1.  I find no statistically significant difference in coverage rates 
between adopting and non-adopting states leading up to the expansions.  The 
pre-adoption trend coefficients in Table A.1 are near zero and statistically 
                                                          
21 I group all observations with a pre-trend value less than or equal to -9 into one category.  I also 
group all observations with a post-trend value greater than or equal to 9 into one category. 
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insignificant for all four types of insurance coverage implying little coverage 
differences between adopting and non-adopting states.  There is a statistically 
significant difference between Medicaid and private insurance rates post-
adoption, however, and the coefficients on the post-adoption trend variable 
indicate the presence of crowd-out.  States who adopted the expansions saw 
increases in their Medicaid rates and decreases in their private insurance 
rates relative to non-adopting states though the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are not exactly equal.  Overall, the results in Table A.1 indicate 
the similarity of coverage rates trends prior to expansion and supports the 
validity of the instrument, but this is by no means a sufficient condition for no 
endogeneity. 
Table A.1: Pre and Post Trends in State Insurance Coverage Rates Work Disabled 
Sample 1992-2008 March CPS 
 
Notes: Results are from the 1992-2008 March CPS for work disabled individuals 
between the ages of 20 and 64. Regressions are OLS regressions of four types of state 
insurance coverage rates (Medicaid, Private, Medicare, and Uninsured) on a pre-
adoption trend and a post-adoption trend. All regressions control for state and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents a 10% 
significance level, ** represents a 5% significance level, and *** represents a 1% 
significance level. All regressions are weighted using the SHADAC constructed weight 
for CPS health insurance coverage. 
A.2: Models of Cost-Shifting 
There are two main threads of literature that focus on modeling 
hospital pricing behavior with regards to cost shifting.  Both threads assume 
that the hospital is faced with two types of insurance: a higher priced private 
market and a lower priced public alternative.  This two-market model has 
been commonly referred to as a mixed economy model and was originally 
discussed in Sloan et al. (1978) as a way of modeling physician participation 
in the Medicaid program.  Using these models, we form predictions as to how 
hospitals respond to a shock in provider revenue, usually originating from a 
change to the public insurance reimbursement rate.   
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The first thread of the cost-shifting literature assumes that hospitals 
behave as profit maximizers either as a monopolist or a firm with some 
degree of market power.  In standard market models, if a hospital is profit 
maximizing, cost-shifting strategies would not be employed.  Profit 
maximizing firms should have already exhausted their market power and 
further price discrimination is not possible, eliminating the ability to cost shift 
onto private payers (Morrisey 1996).  In response to lower public payments, 
profit maximizing health care providers may choose to accept fewer public 
paying patients (Showalter, 1997).  This would be challenging for hospitals 
since most are legally mandated to admit any patient who arrives requiring 
care.  Hospitals would like to serve more private patients than public patients, 
however, since they are reimbursed more per private patient.  Thus, in order 
to attract more private patients to use their facility, profit maximizing 
hospitals will lower private prices (Showalter 1997).   The new private price 
will still be higher than the public reimbursement rate.  This is the opposite of 
what cost-shifting theory would suggest.   
A prediction from the profit maximization assuming models is that 
when the public reimbursement rate is reduced, the private rate should also 
decrease.  That is, we would expect to see a positive correlation between 
Medicaid and private reimbursement rates.  Time series trends in private and 
public health prices run counter to this prediction, however. Figure I plots the 
aggregate hospital payment-to-cost ratios for private, Medicare, and Medicaid 
insurance in the United States from 1992 to 2012.22  As the private payment-
to-cost ratio falls in the late 1990s, the public payment-to-cost ratios rise and 
in the early 2000s when private rates rise again, the public rates decline.  The 
trends documented in Figure I demonstrate a negative correlation between 
private and public hospital payments but this is at best only suggestive 
evidence against the profit maximizing assumption.  
 The second thread of the cost shifting literature does not 
assume profit maximizing behavior and instead focuses on hospitals behaving 
as utility maximizers.  A primary motive for this is that only 18 percent of US 
hospitals in 2011 were investor-owned (for-profit) (American Hospital 
Association 2013).  Not-for-profit hospitals typically have no shareholders so 
any profits generated are used to fund hospital operations or projects such as 
capital improvement or charity care.  Many not-for-profit hospitals have 
mission statements that indicate they seek to meet community needs, 
provide care to as many patients as possible, and advance treatment and 
means of prevention (Ginsburg 2003).  As a result, it is often thought that 
not-for-profit hospitals maximize a utility function with profit margin and 
                                                          
22 The hospital payment-to-cost ratios are from the American Hospital Association’s Trendwatch 
Chartbook. 
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alternative objectives (usually identified within their mission statements) as 
arguments.  
 One of the biggest challenges of the utility maximization 
approach is determining which alternative objectives in addition to profits 
should be included when modeling the hospital’s utility function.  Frakt (2011) 
provides an excellent review of the utility maximizing literature which I will 
briefly describe below.  Several studies assume that there are only two 
arguments in a hospital’s utility function: profits and the total volume of 
medical services provided to the hospital’s community (Dranove 1988; 
Clement 1997; and Zwanziger, Melnick, and Bamezai 2000).  These studies 
find that utility maximization models, unlike the profit maximizing assuming 
models, allow for the possibility of cost shifting but do not guarantee that 
cost-shifting will occur.  Other studies assume that utility maximizing 
hospitals care about their overall appearance to the community or their 
“prestige” (Rosenman et al. 2000; and Friesner and Rosenman 2002).  The 
Rosenman et al. (2000) model shows that prestige maximizing hospitals can 
either cost shift or cost cut in response to reductions in public payments.   
 The two threads of literature produce conflicting theoretical 
predictions.  It is clear that while profit maximization suggests the 
impossibility of cost shifting, utility maximization implies that cost shifting 
may occur.  Given these conflicting theoretical results, there have been 
several empirical attempts to determine whether cost shifting exists in the 
U.S. health care market.  These studies focus not only on whether hospitals 
cost shift, but also to what extent cost shifting occurs.  Provided that 
hospitals shift the burden of the reductions in public payments onto private 
payers, they may do this dollar-for-dollar or at some lower rate.  The majority 
of the empirical literature finds that the extent of cost shifting is far less than 
dollar-for-dollar. 23  Only Cutler (1998) found evidence of dollar-for-dollar cost 
shifting and this was restricted to the 1985-1990 time period.24   
Though a large portion of cost shifting literature was published in the 
late 1990s to early 2000s, even more recent empirical cost-shifting articles 
still produce conflicting results.  Wu (2010) finds evidence of cost-shifting in 
Medicare payment reductions stipulated by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 
though the degree of cost-shifting is relatively small (only 21 cents per dollar 
                                                          
23 Several empirical studies attempt to measure the extent of hospital cost shifting empirically.  
Studies include Clement (1997), Gowrisankaran and Town (1997), Cutler (1998), Dranove and 
White (1998), Zwanziger et al. (2000), Friesner and Rosenman (2002), Dobson et al. (2006),  
Zwanziger and Bamezai (2006), Wu (2010), and Stensland et al. (2010). These are effectively 
summarized in Frakt (2011), Table 2. 
 
24 In the same study, he finds very little evidence of cost shifting from 1990 to 1995 speculating 
this as being a result of increased managed care use during this time period.   
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reduction in Medicare revenue was shifted onto private payers).  White 
(2013) constructs private and Medicare payment rates at a market level for 
the years 1995-2009.  Using a “log-log” specification, the results from White 
(2013) indicate that a 10 percent reduction in the Medicare rate, led to a 7.73 
percent reduction in the private rate.  White’s results suggest that hospitals 
did not pursue cost-shifting, but rather cost-cutting strategies to make up for 
the deficit between private and public rates.  Thus, even the most recent 
empirical estimates still provide mixed results regarding the existence of cost 
shifting in the US health care market. 
A.3 Charges versus Prices/Payments 
 The HCUP NIS contains the total charges for each discharge 
which is not necessarily equal to the actual payments the hospital received for 
the services it provided.  The terms prices and charges are often used 
interchangeably, but in general refer to two distinct variables.  Charges are 
usually understood to be the list price of a service provided at the hospital 
while prices usually refer to the actual payment that hospitals/providers 
received from the insurer (after rates have been negotiated).  It is widely 
believed that charges are irrelevant, marked-up versions of prices and are not 
informative of current hospital cost conditions or behavior.  Several studies, 
however, have indicated that charges may not be completely irrelevant 
particularly in regards to the setting of Medicare reimbursement rates, price 
transparency, uninsured/out-of-network patients, and inpatient outlier 
provision patients (Cookson, 2003, Dobson et al., 2005, Christensen et al., 
2013.).   
 Actual payments and prices would be preferred over charges 
when investigating effects on cost-shifting.  Data sets containing actual 
payments from all insurance types, over long periods of time, for multiple 
states, and at the patient level, however, are rare and expensive.  The 
question remains then as to how informative total charges are in regards to 
payments?  To evaluate this issue, I obtained the MarketScan Commercial 
Claims and Encounters (CCE) database from Truven Health Analytics, Inc. for 
the years 2003 and 2004.  The CCE contains claims (actual payments) data 
from a selection of large employer-provided plans in the United States for 
various encounter environments (Inpatient, Outpatient, Pharmaceuticals, 
etc.).  Using the inpatient encounters data, we can compare charges in the 
HCUP NIS and the claims in the CCE and examine how informative one is of 
the other.   
First, I have to create comparable samples between the CCE and the 
NIS.  In order to align the CCE with my study sample, I eliminate claims for 
patients who are not between the ages of 20 to 64 or who are female.  Since 
the CCE contains commercial claims, I restrict the HCUP NIS to only include 
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patients covered by private insurance in the years 2003 and 2004.  Given that 
there is no direct link between the patients in the two datasets, I calculate the 
average total charges from the NIS and average total payments from the CCE 
for each state-year-DRG cell and then merge the two databases based on 
these three characteristics.  Merging based on state, year, and DRG ensures 
that we are making charge and payment comparisons for patients with similar 
geographic, time, and medical conditions.   
A disadvantage to this analysis is that the CCE only includes 
individuals with employer-provided coverage from large firms while the HCUP 
NIS includes a general census of inpatient discharges in the United States.  
Thus, even though we match charges and payments based on three 
influential characteristics, it is likely that the general population from the NIS 
contains individuals who have less comprehensive private plans than those 
from the large employer-provided population of the CCE. Figure is a 
scatterplot of the matched charges and payments from the two datasets 
along with a 45 degree line.  The scatterplot suggests that there is an 
informative relationship, all-be-it a noisy one, between the charges of the 
HCUP NIS and the payments contained within the MarketScan CCE.  The 
scatterplot also suggests that the degree of mismeasurement between 
charges and payments increases with the level of charges which is 
unsurprising given the results of other studies that have compared actual 
claims to list prices. 
The relationship can be further evaluated using a regression analysis.  
Estimates of a regression of the average payments on the average charges 
imply that for every dollar increase in average charges, average payments 
increases by 0.61 and 0.67 with and without state and year fixed effects, 
respectively.  Though there is clearly measurement error between charges 
and payments, the important takeaway is that there is a fairly informative 
relationship between the two.  Given this, the estimates of the impact of the 
insurance shift on the charge rate can give us an idea of the effect on actual 
payments though actual payments would be require to estimate an exact 
effect. 
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Figure A.3: Relationship between HCUP Charges and Market Scan Payments, Top 
100 DRG's with 45 Degree Line 
 
Notes: The figure compares MarketScan CCE Average Total Payments and HCUP NIS 
Average Total Charges for the years 2003 and 2004 for working age (20-64) men.  
MarketScan CCE Average Total Payments are constructed as the total claims (in 
thousands of dollars) for a state, year, DRG cell divided by the total number of 
patients in the cell.  HCUP NIS Average Charges are constructed as the total charges 
for private patients only in a state, year, DRG cell divided by the total number of NIS 
private patients in that cell.  The data points for the two samples are then merged by 
state, year, and DRG classification. The solid black line is a 45 degree line.   
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